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Contract control history

TimelockControllerUpgradeable on Base — who can change it, and what changed

Timelock under 24hthis contract is a timelock with a 6h minimum delay (under 24h)

This timelock at 0x573a…⁠90a3 on Base is upgradeable, sits behind a 6h timelock. Gliese has recorded 7 control changes. Last checked 2026-09-12 07:28:51 UTC.

TimelockUpgradeable6h timelockBase

Current control surface

snapshot 2026-09-11 05:30:26 UTC
Implementation
EIP-1967 logic contract; an upgrade changes this
Proxy admin
who can upgrade
Owner
owner()
Timelock delay
6h
minimum wait between queue and execution

Recorded events

Open in the feed →

Recent changes

Setup-time events hidden
  1. Call to 0x573a…⁠90a3 scheduled, executable after 6h
    timelock.call_scheduled · tx 0x876f0a16…⁠abf993 · block 51,171,841
    · 2026-09-11 13:23:49 UTC
  2. Call to 0x9b4f…⁠7d45 scheduled, executable after 6h
    timelock.call_scheduled · tx 0x876f0a16…⁠abf993 · block 51,171,841
    · 2026-09-11 13:23:49 UTC
  3. Call to 0x9b4f…⁠7d45 scheduled, executable after 6h
    timelock.call_scheduled · tx 0x876f0a16…⁠abf993 · block 51,171,841
    · 2026-09-11 13:23:49 UTC
  4. Scheduled operation 0xc7d8038b…⁠23a0a5 cancelled
    timelock.cancelled · tx 0xdb274f5f…⁠5efbcd · block 51,167,761
    · 2026-09-11 11:07:49 UTC
  5. Call to 0x573a…⁠90a3 scheduled, executable after 6h
    timelock.call_scheduled · tx 0x4afa3e1f…⁠100b2f · block 51,157,607
    · 2026-09-11 05:29:21 UTC
  6. Call to 0x9b4f…⁠7d45 scheduled, executable after 6h
    timelock.call_scheduled · tx 0x4afa3e1f…⁠100b2f · block 51,157,607
    · 2026-09-11 05:29:21 UTC
  7. Call to 0x9b4f…⁠7d45 scheduled, executable after 6h
    timelock.call_scheduled · tx 0x4afa3e1f…⁠100b2f · block 51,157,607
    · 2026-09-11 05:29:21 UTC
Full history since deployment →
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Criticalpower movedHighsafeguards changedInfoannounced, not yet effective

Data derived from on-chain state and events only. Gliese does not custody funds and does not interpret intent — severity is assigned by how much power a change moves.